Illness in ConText

parole di filosofia e orientamento nella pandemia
testi e articoli


Parole chiave: contagio
Abstract. This article examines Thucydides’ treatment of the cause of the plague, its connection with the Spartans, and Apollo. Thucydides situates references to the plague in various contexts in the narrative, beginning with his account of the suprahuman catastrophes that occurred during the war (1.23) that are woven through the narrative in a seriatim argument that serves methodologically to demonstrate the possibility that Apollo brought the plague to Athens. His method clarifies the positioning of divine assistance in relation to human causation, but it also leaves open the possibility of divine intervention in human history.

When the plague struck Athens in 430 B.C.E., its cause was a matter of urgent speculation, but the general presumption was clear enough: it came from the gods, particularly (though not necessarily solely), Apollo. It is from Thucydides that we know this and much else concerning the gods during the Peloponnesian War. Yet most discussions of contemporary perceptions of the plague’s cause fault the historian for an inadequate account, which usually forms part of a broader critique of his treatment of religion.¹ This overall judgment seems to be an odd byproduct of what is justly regarded as a giant step in the nascent art of historical writing, namely, the secular nature of historical explanation in

¹ See esp. Rubel 2000, 123–34, who has a lengthy review of scholarship on Thucydides’ treatment of religion especially in relation to the plague; also Hornblower 1992; Crane 1996, 163–208; Furley 2006; Flower 2009; Zimm 2010; for the view that Thucydides takes a more neutral or positive stance towards the gods and oracles (going back to Cornford 1907), see, e.g., Oost 1975; Marinatos 1981a, 1981b; Jordan 1986; Bowden 2005 sees Thucydides’ interest in Delphi occurring mostly in a “literary,” “Herodotean” vein.
the History. Scholars couple their recognition of Thucydides’ achievement with the dubious notion that Thucydides had no use for religion and that the gods have no place in a work concerned with rational explanation of historical events.

If many come up empty-handed when attempting to determine Thucydides’ own view of the cause of the plague, there is a good reason: he conspicuously announces his refusal to provide one (2.48.3). In what follows, I would like to engage with the question of Thucydides’ perspective on the role of Apollo. His refusal, I shall suggest, is but one link in a wider nexus of historical causation and explanation that has a methodological and didactic function accompanying historiographical reflection on the role of the divine in history. Thucydides’ framework for the plague narrative provides the instructive core for our examination.

THE INTRODUCTION TO THE PLAGUE (2.47–48)

The introductory section of the plague narrative establishes the interpretative foundation vital to the description of symptoms and consequences to follow. Four key features stand out: a temporal connection between the Spartans and the disease; the singularity of the plague at Athens; the polis of the Athenians as the target; the cause of the plague. Each is programmatic; together, they strongly suggest that Thucydides guides the reader to the conclusion that the disease specifically targeted the Athenians.

The Connection between the Spartans and the Plague

Following the account of the public funeral marking the end of the first year of the war, with its centerpiece, the Funeral Oration, Thucydides makes a swift transition (2.47.2–3):

τοῦ δὲ θέρους εύθύς άρχομένου Πελοποννήσιοι και οί ξύμμαχοι τά δύο μέρη ώσπερ και τό πρώτον εσέβαλον ἐς τήν Άττικήν (ήγεΐτο δέ Αρχίδαμος ο Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς), και καθεζόμενοι ἐδήουν τήν γῆν. και όντων αύτών ού πολλάς πιο ἡμέρας εν τῇ Αττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρώτον ἤρξατο γενέσθαι τοις Αθηναίοις.

Straightaway with the arrival of spring, the Peloponnesians and two thirds of their allies, led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, made an attack on Attica, as in the first invasion, and encamping they started ravaging the land. They had been in Attica not many days at all when the disease first broke out among the Athenians.²

²All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
Gomme (1956) noted the connection between the Spartans and the plague but viewed it as an unavoidable fact of historical temporality. Yet the “historian’s choice” becomes clear as the introduction proceeds. Shortly after (2.48.2), Thucydides notes that, because those living in the Piraeus were infected first, the Athenians believed that the Spartans had poisoned the wells.3

The Singularity of the Plague at Athens

A second element of Thucydides’ introductory remarks is his emphasis on the singularity of the Athenian nosos compared to the outbreak and severity of the disease elsewhere. After noting its arrival in Attica, he writes, “it is said that it had earlier attacked in many places, on Lemnos and other lands as well; yet, never had so extreme a pestilence, so destructive of lives, been remembered as ever having occurred” (λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχότερον ἐγκατασταθήσαι καὶ περὶ Λήμνου καὶ ἐν ἄλλους χωρίοις, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτος γε λοιμός οὐδὲ φθορά οὕτως ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι, 2.47.3). A few sentences later, he begins the account of the plague proper: “It originated, it is said, in Ethiopia, then spread to Egypt, Libya, and over much of the King’s domains. Then it suddenly attacked the polis of the Athenians” (ήρξατο δὲ τὸ πρώτον, ώς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύην κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλείαν γῆν τὴν πολλήν. ἐς δὲ τὴν Αθηναίων πόλιν ἐξαπιναίως ἔσεσθαι, 2.48.1–2).

Thucydides’ initial reference simply to “the plague” that struck Athens, marking the beginning of the account (2.47.3, quoted above), contrasts with the distancing mechanism—“it is said”—employed twice (λεγόμενον, 47.3; ώς λέγεται, 48.1) about the origins and earlier progress of the disease. He sharpens the difference between the occurrences elsewhere and its outbreak in Athens through an emphatic clause marked by negatives and particles concerned with the particular disease that infected the Athenian polis (οὐ ... γενέσθαι, 47.3). By moving from “report” (with no comment on the nature or severity of the disease elsewhere) to explicit statements about the enormity of the disease in Athens, Thucydides marks the plague at Athens as unique.4

3 He then notes that later it spread to the upper polis, which might appear to refute any connection between the Spartans and the plague; but it seems rather to be a statement about contagion; see Holladay and Poole 1979, 296–300; Longrigg 2000, 57–58.

4 He has foreshadowed its singularity earlier (1.23.2–3); I will expand on this below.
The third feature of the introduction is the identified target of the disease, namely, “the polis of the Athenians,” not simply “the Athenians” (2.48.2, quoted above). While this might signpost that not only Athenians were massively stricken by the plague, and refer to the spatial boundaries of the infected inhabitants, it also crucially points to the categorizing of this infection as a collective, political one, and in that respect it suggests a targeting of the body politic.5

The Cause of the Plague at Athens

The fourth and perhaps most striking feature of this section is Thucydides’ explicit unwillingness to venture a cause.6 As he puts it (2.48.3):

λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐκάστος γιγνώσκει καὶ ἰατρός καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἄφ’ ὅτου εἰκός ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτό, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀνατίθηναι νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἰκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστήσαι σχείν· ἐγώ δε οἰόν τε ἔγινε το διαβουλευτικόν, καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπών, εἰ ποτὲ καὶ αὐθικὸς ἐπιπέδου, μᾶλιστ’ ἄν ἔχοι τι προειδώδες μὴ ἄγνοειν

Let anyone, whether doctor or layman, say as each perceives the likely origin of the plague and whatever causes he believes of sufficient power to have produced so great a change; I will restrict myself to a description of the symptoms, on the basis of which anyone examining them would from foreknowledge recognize the disease should it ever attack again.

5Thucydides explores this idea elsewhere in the History, e.g., in 6.14, where Nicias implores the prytanis of the assembly to call another vote (on whether to sail to Sicily) and thereby “be a physician of the polis that has counseled poorly” (τῆς δὲ πόλεως <κακώς> βουλευσαμένης ιατρός άν γενέσθαν); on the diseased city, see Rechenauer 1991,351-53; Padel 1992,53; Kallet 2001,132, n. 46,128-36; on the connections with stasis, see Brock 2000 and Kosak 2000.

6Diodorus (12.45.1–2) reflects another tradition which attributes the plague to the effects of overcrowding, heat, and consequent pollution; I do not share Kosak’s (2000, 49) skepticism that it (and Plut. Per. 34) “hardly counts as proper sources of evidence for the classical period in Greece” if Diodorus was here using Ephorus, as is likely. Demont 2013 argues that Thucydides does show awareness of a rational cause of the plague in 1.23.3, specifically, the connection between droughts and famine and plague, taking the first και in αὐχέναι τε ἐστι παρ’ οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ λημοὶ καὶ ἱ. . . νόσος as “there were great droughts and from them also famine and plague”; yet this rendering does not take sufficient account of the treatment of the plague and the question of its causes; Palmer 1992, 30, states that Thucydides “suggests, if not a cause of the plague, an explanation of how it arrived in Athens (2.48.1–2); it traveled the sea routes of Athenian imperialism.” This would be appealing if correct, but the only locale of the several specifically noted by Thucydides that can be connected to their empire is Lemnos.
That Thucydides explicitly notes what he will not engage in not only places the comment on the verge of a *praeteritio* but also, in combination with his subsequent discussion, serves to suggest the inscrutability of cause (and thereby, paradoxically, to keep alive the issue). He allows that deductive reasoning might yield an answer as to the origin of the disease (taking εικός with the verb γιγνώσκω), and he does not disavow a cause *per se*—he implies its possibility—but he suggests that any answer would lie in the realm of belief; thus the emphasis on the magnitude of the challenge makes the invitation to others to determine a cause seem more like a dare.

**THE EXTENT OF THE CATASTROPHIC WAR (1.23.3)**

The above discussion relates and invites attention to Thucydides’ list of phenomena that occurred in the course of the war and that, along with the war’s length, justify his view of this war’s greatness in comparison to those of the past. It will aid the analysis to quote this section in full (1.23.1–3):

τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μήκός τε μέγα προύβη, παθήματα τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οία οὔχ ετερα ἐν ἱσώ χρόνῳ. οὔτε γάρ πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθείσαι ἠρημώθησαν, αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δὲ ὑπὸ σφών αὐτῶν ἀντιπολεμοῦντων (εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ καὶ οἰκίτορας μετέβαλον ἀλισκόμεναι), οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ

7 On the self-referential authority of 2.48.3, and its relationship to Herodotean first-person polemics and the rhetorical stances of early medical works, see Thomas 2006, 100–102, with earlier bibliography. Cf. 2.49.2, ἀπ’ ουδεμιάς προφάσεως, referring to those who were perfectly healthy and were suddenly stricken by the plague; see Weidauer 1954, 8–20; Rawlings 1975, 74; Rechenauer 1991, 76, 103.

8 Γενόμενον γάρ κρεισσον λόγου τό είδος της νόσου τά τε άλλα χαλεπωτέρως ή κατά την ἄνθρωπεία φύσιν προσέπιπτεν έκάστω και έν τώδε έδήλωσε μάλιστα άλλο τι δν ή των ξυντρόφων τι (“The type of the disease was stronger than could be expressed in words and attacked each person more cruelly than human nature could sustain and showed in this especially that it was alien to any home-bred illnesses,” 2.50.1).

9 Indeed, Thucydides’ use of αἰτία for “cause,” and the verb νομίζω (instead of γιγνώσκω as in the previous clause, signifying knowledge through observation), in the sense of “belief,” seems to carry an implication that whatever one might allege as a cause would fail the test of truth. Rawlings 1975, 73–76, in discussing this passage and its close relationship to Ancient Medicine 6, line 11, notes the correspondence between Thucydides’ use of αἰτία and the Hippocratic author’s; αἰτία would be used to refer to an “alleged” cause (76), while αἴτιον would be used to indicate the “real or primary cause” (75); the effect of 2.48.3 intensifies with commentary such as that “human skill” failed to treat the disease (*anthrōpeia techne*, 2.47.4), where “skill” arguably might have sufficed; and 2.50.1, quoted above, n. 8.
But as for this war, it both lasted long and the sufferings that accompanied it in Greece had never been experienced before in such a space of time. For neither had there ever been so many cities captured and left deserted, some by the barbarians and some by the Greeks warring on one another (and there were some cities that when they were taken changed their inhabitants), nor so much exile and death, some in the war, some because of stasis. And those things which concerning former times were told of, but in fact rarely confirmed, now became credible: earthquakes, which occurred over the greatest extent and were most violent; eclipses of the sun more frequent than were reported of any former time; great droughts in some places, and with them famine; and that which did the most harm and caused the greatest losses, the awful, destructive plague. All these catastrophes combined in attacking along with this war.

The various catastrophes and ills afflicting the participants in the war are presented generically, without a definite article. By contrast, the ultimate catastrophe, the plague, is underscored through a breathless clause stretching the noun’s position at an extreme from its definite article, then with a repeated article followed by vocabulary (λοιμώδης) with tragic but also divine resonances.10

The remarkable inclusion of the non-human-centered catastrophes during the war has never been easy to explain—or explain away. For most, as noted above, the historian’s greatest achievement has been precisely his demonstration that the world could be explained wholly in human terms. Yet it does no service to his—and, therefore, our—understanding

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10 As Parry 1969, 116, comments, the intervening words between the first article and noun “probably set a syntactical record”; see Connor 1984, 31, n. 30: “Λοιμός is . . . often used where there is some suggestion of divine intervention, e.g., Homer Iliad 1.61; Hesiod Works and Days 242f. Hence a λοιμώδης νόσος is a plague that resembles a divine affliction”; see esp. Mitchell-Boyask 2008, 24–28, with 24–25 on Thucydides’ usage of λοιμός both in the adjectival form in 1.23.3 and in the plague description (2.47.3). It should be noted, however, that the term λοιμός can embrace more than just plague, i.e., in addition, failure of crops, human and animal procreation—“a whole complex of disasters” (Parker 1983, 257).
of the war to sweep under the rug, make improbable excuses, or awkward explanations, for what does not conform to our preconceptions, as if the historian has “slipped” a bit from the program.\textsuperscript{11} We need to approach such passages with curiosity, to consider why he might include what he does in the way that he does, and how the deliberate choice might shed light—especially if unexpected—on views of the historical processes that appear in the History.\textsuperscript{12}

As noted at the outset, Thucydides’ contemporaries would have connected the plague to Apollo; Iliad 1 and Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyran- nus provided textbook cases of divinely sent plague.\textsuperscript{13} Within the plague description itself, Thucydides notes the desperate appeals to the gods through oracles and divination and their failure (2.47.4),\textsuperscript{14} and after graphic descriptions of the symptoms and suffering experienced by the victims, the carnage, and the utter powerlessness felt by individuals, whether those trying to help, or those soon to die, he then brings the reader back to the community, when he describes the anomia, the destruction of law, custom, proper piety and ritual—in short, the breakdown of the polis (2.53).\textsuperscript{15} It is at this point that he specifically addresses Apollo’s role in assisting the Spartans.

\textsuperscript{11}For a good illustration and discussion, see, e.g., Hornblower 1991 on 1.23.2–3 and 3.87.4.

\textsuperscript{12}So, too, Foster 2010, 42, on the connection between 1.23.2–3 and the larger narrative, against scholars who regard it purely as rhetorical, e.g., Woodman 1988, 28–32; Tsakmakis 1995, 59.

\textsuperscript{13}Cf. Morgan 1994, 206 (in re: OT 25–28): “Any Greek reading Thucydides’ History would be confronted with powerful literary resonances between the conditions at Athens and the mythology and legends of Troy and Oedipus. It seems scarcely credible to suppose that such resonance was not intended by Thucydides.”

\textsuperscript{14}Thucydides and the archaeological record may provide mutual support. Thompson 1981, 347–48, connects the historian’s testimony of appeals to the gods with two lesser shrines that had fallen into neglect and were refurbished at the time of the plague and whose location suggest that they may have been protective deities.

\textsuperscript{15}It is telling that Thucydides selects the dissolution of religious custom and piety as indicators of the abnormal, dysfunctional community, first in the plague account, and then in his analysis of stasis connected with the civil war on Corcyra (3.81); the historian’s attention to matters of piety, precisely when a community is in crisis, speaks volumes about his understanding of the prerequisites for a properly functioning world; see Price’s provocative comment (2001, 231, within his broader discussion, 217–36): “one would be hard put to find a Greek historical text with instances of sacrilege and religious abuse so frequent or severe as in Thucydides’ History.”
THE ORACLES (2.54)

First, Thucydides mentions an ancient prophecy recalled by older Athenians who, “reasonably [or “naturally”] amidst the throes of so horrible an ill, called to mind the phrase of old, ‘a Dorian war will come, and with it a plague.’” He notes their disagreements over whether the ancients said a “plague” or a “famine,” with “plague” winning out, given present circumstances. He then comments: “but I at least think that if another Dorian war should happen in future and it coincided with a famine, people would thus naturally say ‘famine’” (2.54.2–3).16 The editorial tone (ήν δέ γε οἴμαι . . .) is wry, if not a little sarcastic; this is most readers’ “comfort-zone” Thucydides.17

The narrative concerned with the oracle, however, differs significantly (2.54.4–5):

Those with knowledge about it recalled the oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when they inquired of the god whether they should make war. The god said that if they warred with all their might, they should have the victory, and he himself would assist. Thereupon concerning that prophecy they conjectured that what was happening was corresponding to it. The disease broke out immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, and did not spread into Peloponnesos in any degree worth speaking of, while Athens was afflicted most severely, and next to Athens the places that were most populous.

The contrast between the old prophecy and the more recent oracle lies both in the authority of the recollectors and in Thucydides’ exegesis. The

16 Έν δέ τῷ κακῷ οἳ εἰκός ἀνεμνήσθησαν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους, φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ἔδεισαν ἧξει Δωρικός πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἢμι· αὐτῷ· ἐγένετο μὲν οὖν ἔρις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ λοιμὸν ἀνομάζειν ἐν τῷ ἔποι ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἄλλα λοιμὸν, ἔνικερε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰκότως λοιμὸν εἰρήσει—οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅ ἐπαύσον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο. ήν δὲ γε οἷς ποτὲ ἄλλος πόλεμος καταλαβή Δωρικός τοῦδε ἐστερεός καὶ ἔμβη γενέσθαι λοιμὸν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκός οὕτως ἄσονται.

17 Gomme 1956 regards the comment as ironic, Marinatos 1981a, 139, as neutral on the grounds that “oracular ambiguity” was expected and acceptable; inexplicably, she does not include the following oracle in her treatment.
prophetic verse is given little weight, its original integrity compromised by memory and compounded by arbitrary debate; Thucydides places it in the “useless” if innocuous category. As for the report of the oracle, Thucydides has in fact related it earlier in the History (1.118.3). The Spartans, though they have already determined upon war, duly “send to Delphi to ask the god whether making war would be the better thing to do, and the god responded, so it is said, that if they put their strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and he himself said that he would assist them, whether invited or not.” Thucydides reports the oracle noncommittally with the qualifier, “it is said.” Shortly after, he has the Corinthians mention it in their speech to the Peloponnesian League (1.123). Here, however, in the context of a now-raging plague, his position shifts. He authorizes those remembering the oracle by noting that they had “knowledge about it.” Moreover, instead of indulging in idle wordplay like their elders, these men (in the μέν clause) “conjectured,” that is, drew inferences and reached a conclusion from examining their circumstances in relation to the oracle. Most significant, however, is what follows (in the δέ clause): additional supporting evidence of the oracle’s accuracy, exceeding the space devoted to the oracle itself (54.5). In my view, Thucydides is not supplying the reasoning of those who saw the similarity between the oracle and the present, but rather his own arguments, in structure parallel to his comment on the earlier prophecy. As Rusten notes, “the contrast (μέν/δέ) appears to lie between the guesses of others (ήματες) and the facts known to T.: ‘as to the oracle, they surmised that the events agreed (with the prophecy); and the plague did begin right after the Spartan invasion.’”

181.118.3: Πέμψαντες δέ ές Δελφούς έπηρώτων τόν θεόν εϊ πολεμούσιν ἄμεινον έσται· ὃ δέ ἀνέστηκεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατά κράτος πολεμούσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, και αὐτός ἐφη ζυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος. Parker 1985, 325, notes that the format of the question, “is it better,” normally shows that a decision had not yet been made; but the positioning of the visit to Delphi after reporting the Spartans’ decision, in my view, suggests otherwise. Parke and Wormell 1956, 188, seem to adopt this in stating that “in the autumn of 432 B.C. the Spartans had decided that the Athenians had broken the treaty of 445 B.C. and were resolved to go to war.”

19Demont 1990, 155; Westlake 1977, 349–50, explains the use of the phrase variously, including Thucydides’ “uneasiness” when he comments on the supernatural (see also 354).

20Thucydides demonstrates in the Archaeology that one can trust in certain oral traditions, e.g., in citing “the most credible of the Peloponnesian oral traditions” (1.9) (for the view of Pelops’ migration to the Peloponnesian with large amounts of wealth).

21Rusten 1989 ad loc. Here the δέ seems close in sense and emphasis to γάρ; cf. 1.86.2 with Denniston 1981, 169 (C. I. i). An additional point of substance is the unlikelihood that the men to whom Thucydides refers would know—or care?—whether the disease had affected the Peloponnesian to any extent.
First, Thucydides repeats a point he made at the outset of the account about the timing of the Peloponnesian invasion (2.47.3). Second, he notes the absence of any perceptible spread of the disease to the Peloponnesians. These comments move beyond endorsing the authenticity of the oracle and the conjecturing that it might be true; they appear to support its fulfillment. This is a critical point. There is no refutation, no sarcastic aside, no rationalizing critique of the view of the divine origin of the disease.

PERICLES' AND HAGNON'S EXPEDITIONS

The account of the plague ends here. What follows is a section of military narrative (temporally signposted earlier, 2.47.1), not given the attention it deserves, sandwiched between the plague and Pericles’ final speech (2.55–58). Treating two military campaigns in the second year of the war, one led by Pericles to the Peloponnesian, whose principal aim was to capture Epidaurus, the other by Hagnon to assist Athens’ siege of Potidaea, its subject in the Chalcidice that had revolted in 432, it reads like an interlude—quite a feat for a war narrative. Certainly it affords a welcome pause after the excess of the Funeral Oration and the intensity of the plague account, and before the final speech and Thucydides’ assessment. But it is very far from returning the reader to the “normalcy” of war in the form of a business-as-usual, life-must-go-on narrative of military activity. I suggest that one critical function is to continue the association.

By noting the disease’s contagion by referring to its spread to neighboring populous areas, is Thucydides perhaps underscoring the Peloponnesians’ immunity (whether in the geographical space of the Peloponnesian or outside), given that the Peloponnesians that were present in Attica were numerous but evidently not infected—at least, one should emphasize, in his historiographical treatment? The identity of these neighboring towns is unclear; the reference appears to stand as a kind of “control group,” i.e., non-Athenians who caught the plague but were not Peloponnesians.

Contrast the recent view of Furley 2006, 416, that Thucydides “refrains utterly from passing judgement on whether the gods favored one side or the other”; Connor 1984, 100–101, with n. 53, in rejecting the commonly held view that Thucydides’ account in chap. 54 is sarcastic, similarly rejects the notion that Thucydides is commenting on the validity of oracles and is rather concerned to address the issue of memory and transmission.

The absence of such commentary is significant whether or not the supporting section is his contribution, or a report of what others said.

Foster 2010, 186, and Rechenauer 2011, 244–45, though each is brief, appreciate the significance of the narrative.

Mitchell-Boyask 2008, 41–42, aptly casts the narrative effect.
of the Peloponnesians with the plague. Two parts (2.55–56.3 and 2.57) on the Peloponnesians and the plague, with implications for the role of Apollo, strengthen the suggestion of a mutual connection.

The first contains a remarkable degree of chronological and geographical precision (2.55–56.3). (Bold face words are temporal; underlined are geographical phrases.):

After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they entered what are called the coast lands (Paralos) and penetrated as far as Laurion, where are the silver mines belonging to the Athenians. First they ravaged that part of the coast which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that situated towards Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, continued to insist, as in the former invasion, that the Athenians should remain within their walls. Before, however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against Peloponnesus. When all was ready he put to sea, having on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first time out of their old ships. The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels. And when the Athenian expedition was putting out to sea, they left behind the Peloponnesians on the coast of Attica.

Evidence of the historian’s “chronological investment” is on display here. Through both temporal precision (in the use of adverbs and the imperfect tense), and the correlation of discrete events in geographically different arenas, the narrative establishes that the Peloponnesians would have been in a position to observe the launch of Pericles’ expedition toward the Peloponnesse, a conclusion warranted by (a) the emphasis on the Spartans’ location while Pericles was preparing the expedition, and

27Another is to cast a critical spotlight on Pericles, as Foster 2010 recognizes.
(b) his expeditious preparation, so as to suggest that (c) the Peloponnesians’ arrival on the coast facing the Peloponnese coincided with the departure of the fleet.28

These correlations seem to imply that the Spartans were not deterred in their campaign by the prospect of an Athenian attack on the Peloponnese, and by continuing their plundering of Attica they seem not to have been frightened off by the plague. This, at least, is Thucydides’ evident view, expressed farther on. When the expedition returned home, it found the Spartans and their army gone from Attica.29 The historian comments (2.57):

All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained in the country and the Athenian naval expedition continued, the plague was raging both among the troops and in the city. The fear which it inspired was said to have induced the enemy to leave Attica sooner than they intended; for they heard from deserters that the disease was in the city, and likewise saw the burning of the dead. Still, in this invasion they ravaged the whole country, and they remained about forty days, the longest duration ever.

In the earlier passage, Thucydides implied that the Peloponnesians did not fear the plague and remained even when they saw Pericles’ expedition assembled (the verb κατέλιπον emphasizes how close the Peloponnesians were to the departing Athenian fleet); here he positively refutes the notion, and with it any suggestion that Pericles’ expedition brought about the departure of the Peloponnesians.30 Indeed, the impression Thucydides’ account creates is of a Peloponnesian army, unafraid, undeterred, deliberately going about the invasion as planned, leaving Attica only upon completion of their (evident) aim, namely, a full-scale ravaging of the country.31

28 As Marchant 1891 notes on 57.1, “the sense is not that the plague raged during the simultaneous ravaging in Attica and in Peloponnnese, but both while the Peloponnesians were in Attica, and while the A. were away on the expedition”; the verb κατέλιπον brings out the physical closeness of the enemies. On temporal strategies generally, see the valuable discussion of Rood 1998, chap. 5.

29 Gomme 1956, 163, is the rare commentator to note the precision Thucydides bestows on the preparation and launching of the expedition, contrasted with the “rather more vaguely” dating in 56.6, the Athenian attacks mentioned here. This lends support to the argument here that the setting out of the Athenians in relation to the Peloponnesians’ location in Attica is what matters to the historian, and not the chronological precision per se.

30 Diodorus states that Pericles’ expedition caused the Spartans to leave Attica (12.45.3), reflecting the common view mentioned by Thucydides.

31 This last statement has intriguing implications. Apollo pronounced that the Spartans would be victorious if they warred with all their might, and that he would assist, whether
As for the Athenian expeditions, three aspects stand out: their size—the same that sailed to Sicily in 415, failures, respectively, and casualties, none of them represented as occurring in military combat. The military force included four-thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, as well as fifty Chian and Lesbian ships, presumably with crew (2.56.1–2). Pericles’ principal target was Epidaurus—not coincidentally, the home of the healing god Asclepius—yet, “despite hopes of taking it, they were utterly unsuccessful”; subsequent forays in the Peloponnese had minimal impact. Men died of the plague on this expedition, but Thucydides does not quantify.

Hagnon’s expedition in the north is more expansive on this score. The arriving army “tried in every way to capture Potidaea, but they had no success in either the capture of the city nor in any other respect worthy of their military preparation” (τῆς παρασκευῆς ἄξίως, 58.2–3):

invited or not (predicted in 1.118.3 and supported in 2.54). Certainly the Spartans put every effort into the very invasion with which the plague coincided—or, more accurately, Thucydides emphasizes the intensity and duration of the Spartans’ invasion this particular year, thereby suggesting the partnership with their co-combatant Apollo on its expressed terms. The Spartans’ failure—in Thucydides’ analysis—to understand how war against Athens could be won, and thus, by implication, how to fight, κατά κράτος, is part of a critique in both warfare and strategy of the Spartans’ collective capacity. Yet, if so, the presentation is also freighted: from the perspective of military strategy, the Spartans will mostly fail—in Thucydides’ analysis—to understand how a war against Athens could be won, and thus, by implication, how to fight κατά κράτος; see Kallet-Marx 1993, 204-5; 2001, 240-42, 250-51, 256-59, 270-81.32

32Thuc. 6.31.2, referencing Pericles’ and Hagnon’s expeditions.

33Οὐ μέντοι προσφέρησε γε, 2.56.4; note the emphatic adversative μέντοι... γέ (Denniston 1981, 405, II.2.ii). Whether the failed attempt to take Epidaurus and the purification of Delos should be connected is tantalizing, but uncertain; Asclepius, “an upwardly mobile hero . . . would doubtless have reached Athens in the end, even without [the plague],” Parker 1996, 180. Delian activity would seem reasonably to bear on the plague and Apollo’s role as healer (Graf 2009, 9–10, 79–102, on Apollo’s roles as bringer of plague and healer); Flower 2009, 6–8; but other connections are possible, as Parker 1996, 150, notes; on Thucydides and the suggestion that Cleon was behind the purification, see Brock 1996; see also Hornblower’s extensive discussion (1991, 517–25). I shall return to the purification and Delos in the conclusion.

34The army mostly ravaged coastal land. The one capture and sack of a Laconian town, Prasiai, is minimized by its characterization as a mere polisma; so, too, Foster 2010, 185.
For the plague attacked the Athenians there and distressed them exceedingly, wasting the army, so that even the previously healthy soldiers of the Athenians of the former expedition caught the disease from Hagnon’s troops. But Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded were no longer in the neighborhood of the Chalcidians. So Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days.

The death toll of the men from Athens in so few specified days stuns. Athenians continue to be emphasized as targets: even far from Athens (ένταοδε δι), perfectly healthy Athenians were stricken; the reference to Phormio’s army, “no longer” there, but by implication, could have been, makes the point, simply, that the losses would likely have been greater.

The narrative of these military expeditions, then, is vital to the construction of the plague as targeting Athenians, whether in Attica or foreign territory, including, most significantly, the Peloponnese. It also concentrates attention on the military implications of the plague in undermining the Athenians’ ability to make war through damage to their power (dunamis) (Rechenauer 2011). Furthermore, by situating the disease firmly in the war, and by making it responsible for all the deaths on the expeditions, Thucydides implies that the soldiers who fell victim to the disease, despite dying on a military campaign, did not do so heroically in combat, the kind of death Pericles celebrated in the Funeral Oration; their lives and their deaths were wasted.

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35 Cf. 2.49.2 on the healthy suddenly falling ill; that Thucydides mentions that Chians and Lesbians were part of the expedition (56.2) makes the emphasis on Athenian losses even more conspicuous and brings us back to the introduction to the plague narrative.

36 It would be unwise to press an argument from silence, namely, that in reality no Peloponnesians succumbed to the disease; Thucydides notes, for example, that the Athenians captured and sacked the town of Prasiai, which might imply that the soldiers came into contact with its inhabitants; if so, Thucydides’ silence about any deaths other than Athenian is even more striking. Toole 1978, without warrant, extends the argumentum ex silentio to historical reality.

37 The contrast with the Funeral Oration is searing: these soldiers, some under Pericles’ command, who died of plague, not in combat, within a war insisted upon by Pericles (see, e.g., 1.127.3, 140–44), would not have satisfied the sole prerequisite of heroism delineated in the oration, namely, death in battle fighting for the city. This should be seen, I suggest, as part of a sustained critique of Pericles in relation to the war.
THE ORACLE ABOUT THE HABITATION
OF THE PELARGICON (2.17)

We have observed a number of linkages, of the Peloponnesians and the plague, of divine assistance in relation to the plague, and of that assistance in relation to the Athenians’ military power in their war with the Spartans. One further passage is relevant to the linkage of the plague, the divine, and the war. Earlier in the work, Thucydides includes discussion of an additional oracle in connection with the war (directly) and the plague (indirectly). Its broader context is the account of the relocation of the Athenians dwelling outside the city walls to the urban center inside them. In it Thucydides emphasizes the emotional strain on Athenians who not only had to abandon their ancestral homes but also their local shrines. He then mentions the temples and sanctuaries of the city’s gods concentrated on and around the acropolis, one purpose of which is to make clear that Athenians would by necessity be moving into sacred space.

In this context he mentions a curse against inhabiting the Pelargicon and takes issue with the common interpretation of “the end of a certain Pythian oracle that prohibited it as well, saying ‘the Pelargicon is better left unused’” (2.17.1). Whereas people thought disaster struck because the Pelargicon was used as dwelling space, in Thucydides’ view, “the opposite happened to what people expected. It was not because of unlawful inhabitation that disaster befell the polis; rather, the compulsion for occupation arose because of the war, which the oracle did not name, but it did foresee that it would not be good when the Pelargicon was inhabited” (2.17.2). While it is not necessarily a mental leap to foresee that habitation of sacred land might be problematic, the very fact that the historian chooses

38 Εβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλέπισσα ἔφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερά διὰ παντὸς ἣν ἀυτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρχαion πολιτείας πάτρια διαὶταν τε μελλόντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ σώδεν ἄλλο ἡ πόλις τὴν αὐτοτε ἄπολείπων ἐκκατοστο (2.16.2); this passage, in which Thucydides makes the disarray of sacred space and local cults an important part of the story of displacement at this time, and the larger narrative context of 2.14–17, constitute a significant reason for doubting that the Callias Decree (IG I 5 25A), concerned with the removal of the treasures of the gods from around Athens and Attica outside the city walls to the Acropolis, was passed some two years before, in 434/3, the “orthodox” date (see ML 58); see Kallet-Marx 1989; Samons 1996. Foster 2010, 179–80, nicely contrasts Thucydides’ poignancy in noting the distress Athenians were under leaving their homes with Pericles’ callous devaluing of private property in his last speech, 2.62.3; see also Taylor’s valuable discussion (2010, 43, 53–58, and passim), which argues that in devaluing the land, Pericles in effect repudiates the very foundation of “Athenian-ness,” their autochthony.

39 See Parker 1985, 164, on the Athenians’ concerns about the Pelargicon.
to bring up, defend, but also correct the interpretation making the rounds in Athens at the time demonstrates a concern to link the divine, the war, and, implicitly, the plague. It is notable particularly because Thucydides himself stands as an interpreter, a role he more often criticizes. The approach in this example, together with the others mentioned or examined above, illuminates the method by which the historian constructs, embeds, and deepens meaning in order to make the reader question, ponder, and evaluate the precise role accorded to the divine in relation to the war’s causality, and, by extension, causation in general. We need now to consider how the manner and nature of his exegesis help us appreciate what he is saying about the divine realm and the war.

THUCYDIDEAN METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

Two complementary approaches can help to illuminate Thucydides’ method of furthering understanding. First, reader-response criticism, employed by Connor in his influential study of Thucydides’ techniques of generating meaning, has much to offer in thinking about the way in which Thucydides gradually brings Apollo into an intimate relationship with the plague at Athens through a process of questioning, adjustment, and challenging the reader to contemplate the issue from various perspectives, finally moving to an appreciation of the gravity of the Athenians’ suffering because of the plague’s connection to Apollo. Second, Mink’s (1987) analyses of the process of achieving historical understanding, through “grasping together” what is constituted and examined as a historical event, well apply to Thucydides’ interpretive approach. Mink’s concern is with the essential work in which historians engage in order to achieve

40 Both Gomme 1956, ad loc., and Marinatos 1981a, 139–40, note that Thucydides is affirming the oracle’s accuracy; they rightly reject Cobet’s emendation of προήδε, “knew beforehand,” “prophesied,” to προήδε, “sang beforehand” (which presumably would have “rescued” Thucydides from the charge of accepting a Delphic oracle). Hornblower 1991, ad loc., rejecting the emendation, sees irony in the passage; Furley 2006, 419–20, drawing on Orwin 1994, 88–89, who, noting that if emendation is unwarranted, tellingly writes, “one is apparently forced to the conclusion that Thucydides accredits an oracle with foreknowledge” (420, my emphasis), but then goes on to state that “the case is not proven”; Parke and Wormell 1956, 190, argue indefensibly that the passage contains a criticism of the oracle per se; see also Longrigg 2000, 57 (Thucydides’ “dismissive attitude”).

Subtle and nuanced, Thucydides’ *seriatim* method exposes the plague and oracles in differing contexts or from different vantage points, those of agents, or internal and external observers, that are flagged with uncertainty and in some cases are incomplete—in other words are unable to be fully comprehended in their isolated context. There may also be contrasts or contradictions that reflect different circumstances, speech, narrative, analysis, and actors. Full understanding comes only from the eventual resolution or clarification of the discretely ambiguous commentary. The first reference to the plague (1.23.3) situates it as the crowning, implicitly most devastating, example of “incredible” events that occurred during the war; it leaves a question mark because of its placement in the list of suprahuman occurrences with a descriptor (λοιμώδης) suggestive of a divine aspect. In the next passage (1.118.3), we learn that the Spartans, now determined upon war, seek guidance from Delphi. The god promises assistance, but his response comes mediated via the distancing λέγεται, “it is said.” Within a brief narrative space, the status of the oracle shifts toward authenticity when the Corinthians, in the conclusion of their final speech to the Peloponnesian League, broadcast Apollo’s promise of assistance; but there is still a heavy rhetorical filter and, importantly, we learn nothing about the oracle’s quality. Subsequently, in the description of the move within the city walls by the Athenians preceding the war’s outbreak, Thucydides comments on an oracle predicting harm if people inhabited the Pelargicon (2.17); in this passage, Thucydides offers the first explicit, authorial foreshadowing of a divine role in the war. As readers follow this narrative thread linking, first, the plague and the war, then Pythian Apollo and his promised assistance, to endorsement by Thucydides that the war would somehow involve the divine, questions come closer to resolution: readers know, ahead of the account of the plague, that the confinement within the city walls, the Spartans, and the oracle are all linked, and the later passages add causal texture to the earlier ones.

By the outset of the plague narrative, questions about the cause and nature of the disease have been raised, readdressed, and adjusted in accordance with the differing contexts. Rather than being resolved or clarified, they anticipate. In the introduction to the plague, the refusal to engage with a possible cause is only made more intriguing, if not more
mysterious, by comments about the impossibility of human comprehension of the disease. Only at the end of his account of the plague does Thucydides confirm the connection between Apollo and the plague. The placement is critical: no explicit signaling of a divine cause of the plague would have been understood within his causal framework if it had occurred in advance of his descriptive account of its devastation.

The gradual, sequential route toward engendering awareness of the divine origins of the plague, from dangling the possibility of accurate foreknowledge (1.118.3) to the demonstration of the horrible, causal actuality, all along the way with signposts and questions, is an essential part of the historian’s narrative agenda, but we need to ask why. The belief that the plague resulted from divine intervention could not be fitted into the secular empiricism underpinning Thucydides’ causal framework. A different approach was required. I suggest that the narrative strategies employed, a combination of, for example, as we have seen, distancing, reserving of judgment, corrections, focalizations, even geographical and temporal juxtapositions, together both reflect and constitute a kind of tested, empirical deductive reasoning that contrasts diametrically with the ready, gullible or arbitrary acceptance of prophecies, seers, and the like, on which Thucydides can heap scorn (e.g. 2.54.3; 5.103.2). At the end, the reader has evidence and analysis accompanied by graphic descriptions of the plague’s symptoms and effects, but if Thucydides had made one explicit declarative statement to that effect, at some point in the narrative, it would have had no necessarily higher authority than the readily accepted pronouncements of oracle mongers and seers.

As in the case of the above examples, in which Thucydides is concerned about learning from history, the method is also fundamentally didactic. We learn how to understand the relationship between the divine and causation through narrative juxtapositions, which establish unequivocally the distinction between cause and assistance. Let us first return to 1.23, where the “incredible” occurrences during the war that we looked at above are immediately followed by Thucydides’ statement of the causes of the outbreak of war (1.23.4–6):

43 It is helpful to recall 2.48.3, with its invitation to others to discover a cause; typical vocabulary of deduction and rational cause (σιδώς, αἰτίαι) is juxtaposed with terms casting doubt on its possibility (e.g., τοσαύτη μεταβολή).

44Thucydides’ alternative approach should seem familiar, for it has its direct analogue in the historian’s general methodology, outlined explicitly in the “methods chapters” (1.20–22) and later in the “Peisistratid digression” embedded in the Sicilian expedition narrative (esp. 6.53), in which testing and painstaking critical enquiry are the hallmark of the good historian (if woefully lacking in Thucydides’ fellow citizens).
(All these catastrophes combined in attacking along with this war.) It was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians with the dissolution of the Thirty Years’ Treaty made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the treaty, I first give an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask what circumstances plunged the Greeks into a war of such magnitude. The real cause I believe to be the one least apparent in discussion, namely, that the Athenians, their power growing and instilling fear in the Spartans, forced them into going to war.

If the plague and, potentially, other of the irrational *pathemata* may have been brought on by the divine, the historian is clearly not asserting that Apollo or some other god caused the Peloponnesian War itself. If we were intended to conclude that the suprahuman phenomena are mentioned in order to make a point about divine causation, the explicit statement on the war’s human-centered causes, both immediate and larger, would be rendered absurd; more so, it would be completely undermined. Rather, Thucydides makes clear that the catastrophes, the ultimate of which was the plague, were “co-combatants” in the war—they “combined in attacking” (ξυνεπέθετο, 1.23.3).

Thucydides develops the distinction between human causation and divine assistance explicitly in another passage (1.118), part of which we examined above, that concludes the supporting argument (1.89–118, the “Pentecontaetia”) for Thucydides’ view of “the real cause” of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.6). He summarizes the attitude of the Spartans in a remarkably detailed account of their thinking, in particular, their traditional reluctance to go to war unless compelled, and the impact that the power of the Athenians was having on their own alliance, which combined to render the geopolitical state of affairs intolerable. Thucydides juxtaposes with the Spartans’ reasoning their subsequent embassy to Delphi and the god’s response, quoted above (1.118.1–3).

Thucydides is scrupulous in positioning the divine role of Apollo as helper to the Spartans against the Athenians, in a war caused by the military buildup by Athens of its power and the compulsion that it, and only it, placed on the Spartans; he positions the consultation of Apollo

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after the Spartans were already intent on war for the reasons expressed. This in turn explains well his treatment of the oracle about the Pelargicon. The move from outside the city walls into the urban center affected the Athenians’ gods as much as themselves; Thucydides casts the effect on the city’s shrines as an indicator of the disruption of the proper order of things. While he gives credence to the oracle itself, he fits it into his causal scheme as outlined in 1.23.5–6: war caused the habitation in sacred space, the war that also activated the assistance of Apollo in helping to harm the Athenians. Shortly after, when the plague infected the polis, the nature of the assistance was clear.

Thus, the narrative establishes the crucial methodological relationship between human-centered causation and divine assistance. Moreover, just as Thucydides was the first to classify historical causation and explanation (1.23.5–6), equally systematically, I suggest, though much differently in terms of method and narrative approach, he establishes how to think about the place of the divine in the human world of power and empire. In sum, his treatment of the divine origins of the plague (and associated earthquakes) should occasion neither unease nor chagrin.

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45 See above, p. 363, with n. 18; similarly, Apollo instructs the Greeks before Salamis to pray to the winds, which would be their allies (Hdt. 7.178.1); cf. 8.64.2, 143.2.

46 The later passage noting the second outbreak of the plague (3.87) is relevant. After indicating its severity, effect on Athenian power, and estimates of total losses of life, Thucydides also comments on the frequency of earthquakes at this time as well, which has unsettled commentators, e.g., Hornblower 1991, ad loc.: the passage “seems, disturbingly, to suggest that there was some causal connection between the plague and the earthquakes”; cf. also Oost 1975, 191–92: “May one be forgiven for suggesting that reluctant admissions such as this one, or that of Von Fritz (as well as of others), may show an unwillingness, due perhaps to preconceived notions about Thucydides’ thinking, to admit what seem to be plain implications that the historian was not always the complete and perfect rationalist?” Shortly after (89.1–2), Thucydides refers again to (likely the same) earthquakes, in conjunction with which he notes the occurrence of tidal waves. It is interesting that he ventures a scientific explanation for the phenomenon of the waves but not for the earthquakes themselves; see also 2.8.3, the earthquake on Delos on the eve of war, with Hornblower’s note on the perceived “earthquake problem” with Hdt. 6.98. Rubel 2000, 123–24, with nn. 13 and 14, notes the commonality of attributing natural catastrophes, especially earthquakes, to the gods in pre-modern societies.

47 Parry 1969, 116, points to the verbs used to describe the attack of the plague as suggestive of a military attack.
THUCYDIDES, AN ORACLE, AND THE PERIODIZATION OF THE WAR

Thucydides’ own interpretation of the oracle concerned with the Pelargicon—that the war compelled the inhabitation of the sacred space, which brought destruction—and his endorsement of Apollo’s assistance to the Spartans if they went to war indicate that a divine factor figured in the historical analysis of this cataclysmic war. There is arguably a more personal investment. This was a war of which Thucydides takes explicit credit for recognizing its “greatness” from its outset, but that also, during its course, led him to make a bold historiographical decision. In the so-called “second preface” (5.26), following the conclusion of the narrative of the Archidamian war and the terms of the Peace of Nicias and alliance with Sparta, Thucydides presents a robust defense of his construction of a single war out of two ten-year wars separated by a peace lasting seven years (5.26.2–4):

καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἰ τις μὴ ἀξίωσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὑμᾶς δικαιώσει. τοῖς [τε] γὰρ ἑργοῖς ὡς διηρήτωται, καὶ εὑρήσει οὐκ εἶκός ὁν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθήναι. . . . ὥστε εἶν τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷ δεκέτει καὶ τῇ μετ’ αὐτὸν ἥπετρῳ ἁνοκοκχῆ καὶ τῷ ἑστερόν ἐξ αὐτῆς πολέμων εὑρήσει τις τοσάτῳ ἔτη, λογίζομενος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ ἡμέρας, οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκόντας, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ χρησιμοῦν τις ἐσχισματούς μόνον δὴ τοῦτο ἄρχοντα ἐθύμβαν. αἱ δὲ ἐγὼ ἐγκυμώνω, καὶ ἀρχηγοῦν τὸ πολέμιον καὶ μέχρι οὗ ἐπελεύθησα, προφερομένον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὃτι τριὰ ἐννέα ἔτη δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτῶν.

Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be rationally judged a state of peace. . . . So that anyone, adding together the first ten years’ war, the uneasy truce that followed it, and the subsequent war, calculating according to years, will find that I have given the correct number of years, with the difference of a few days; and to those who made any assertions on the basis of oracles, this one alone happened to be clear-cut. I certainly all along remember from the beginning to the end of the war its being commonly declared that it had to last thrice nine years.

The approach is typical Thucydides: meticulous detailing of the chronological termini (including a calculation that allows for a minuscule margin of error) in support of a revisionist argument, in this case, that the Peace was not a peace but rather, in effect, a continuation of war, an integral part of one long conflict. Significantly, in light of our analysis above of his method of showing the relationship between the rational analysis of
human causation and the role of the divine, Thucydides first demonstrates that he has arrived at his conclusion that there was actually one war lasting twenty-seven years on the basis of rational criteria; he then brings the oracle in as support.48

What is important to recognize is that the periodization is crucial for the historian to prove, for it is half of the foundation on which he justifies his subject as both "more worth writing about than any previous war" and "the greatest disturbance to shake the Hellenic world" (1.1.1–2): his criteria are the war’s length and extent of suffering (1.23.1). In the competitive world of early (and later) historical writing, Thucydides’ war thereby surpassed the Trojan War in length, as well as the Persian Wars.49

As self-evident as it was by the fourth century B.C.E. that there was a Peloponnesian War, this is owing to Thucydides’ persuasive, rational grounds for thinking so (neatly supported by his extraordinary narrative of the years of the “Peace” in which violence, treachery, and demonstrations of the farce of oaths and alliances prevailed).50 However, we need to appreciate the extent to which Thucydides was going out on a limb in periodizing the war as a twenty-seven-year conflict; his credibility—his historiographical bona fides—was on the line. The length of the justification, the polemical tone and language, the counting of the days, make this clear enough.51 First comes the rational basis for his contention (battles, non-observance of treaties, etc., 5.26.2, not quoted above); then he provides his insurance: an unambiguous—for once—oracle about a “thrice-nine-years war.”52

48 Cf. Powell 1988, 394–95: “We may suspect that the prophecy about thrice nine years of war derived from the solar eclipse, which occurred very close to the opening of hostilities. This impressive event might plausibly have been claimed to represent the start of a long period of profound misfortune, such as the war then beginning.”

49 The daring with which he dismisses the Persian Wars as concluded with a couple of land and sea battles is itself astonishing (1.23.1); for the relative insignificance of the Trojan War, 1.10–11.

50 So Diodorus (Ephorus) 12.37.2: “Thucydides . . . gave an account of the war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, the war which has been called the Peloponnesian. This war lasted twenty-seven years.”

51 Relevant as well is the issue of the precise beginning of the war; see Rawlings 1979.

52 This sentence has received much scrutiny, principally over the clause καὶ τοῖς ἄπο χρησμῶν τι ἀσχολημένοις μόνον δὴ τότε ἐχθρῶς ἐξεμάκρινε. It has usually been taken as a snide comment about oracles; Crawley’s translation, “and to afford an instance of faith in oracles being for once justified by the event,” is representative (Strassler 1996). Marinatos 1981a, 140, takes the view that Thucydides is here disparaging of oracle-mongers (“those who obstinately maintained”) and not the oracle; Dover 1988, 71–72, rejects Marinatos’ translation and sees the phrase as neutral (“venture to affirm”) “and could perfectly well
Thucydides implicitly contrasts himself here with those individuals who rely on oracles for knowledge. His knowledge about the length of the war, however, does not come from the oracle; it depends on his own empirical analyses and assessments. The oracle, as he casts it—which is wholly our concern here—was a fortuitous supporter, providing unambiguous confirmation that Thucydides’ criteria about what constitutes war and peace, respectively, hit the mark. It is crucial to recognize that he follows the comment about the oracle with an unequivocal endorsement: “in fact I remember it being said from the beginning of the war.” This assimilates it closely to both 2.17 and 2.54. It is not merely another unambiguous confirmation of the validity and veracity of an oracle, however, but one that cuts to the heart of Thucydides’ historiographical project.53

We should here recall the first sentence of the History: “Thucydides, the Athenian, composed the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning immediately at its outset, and expecting that it would be great and more worthy of record than any before, taking as my evidence that both sides went into it at the height of their preparedness and observing the rest of the Hellenic world joining either side, some right away, others intending to” (1.1). Most apparent is the breathtaking self-confidence in his own predictive powers—note that the subject of every verb and participle is Thucydides himself—but his method is on display as well: his forecast, he insists, is based on empirically driven criteria, not some abstract or tragic notion. But re-periodizing as one event could not be harmed by a bit of divine help. Mention of the oracle of the “thrice-nine-years war” comes at the point when it is useful, in the “second preface.”

53 This may explain why it alone of the oracles with which Thucydides deals was “secure”: for one thing it concerned numbers, which do not require interpretation (unlike that concerning the Pelargicon, or the victory to the Spartans if they fought with all their might)—interpretation was, however, required of Thucydides when it came to peace. Thus, we are pointed in the direction of Thucydides’ personal investment, or defensiveness, depending on one’s point of view.
Writing about the narrative of the end of the Sicilian expedition, and with respect to Thucydides’ use of *panolethria* ("total destruction," 7.87.6), in a nod to Herodotus’ use of the term in relation to the Trojan War, Connor comments, "The passage seems to me to raise the question of theodicy, but to leave it quite open. It is not a statement of Thucydides’ theology, but a way to lead an enlightened and sophisticated audience to confront the awesome possibility that there may be a divine dimension in human history."  

One question left unexplored, and beyond the scope of this examination, but that seems appropriate to mention in conclusion, is why did Pythian Apollo side with the Spartans? The Athenians’ role in the Sacred War (1.112) shortly before the Thirty Years Peace was concluded, in which they contested Sparta’s control of Delphi by placing the Phocians in control, seems a rather distant grudge; and by 431, the Phocians fought on the Peloponnesian side (2.9). The period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars saw an increasing division between Dorians and Ionians, and it might be tempting to view the war from the perspective of an alignment of Pythian Apollo with Dorians and Delian Apollo with the Athenians’ side.  

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54 Delphi is represented as a catalyst in the “grievances and disputes” that led to the outbreak of war (1.25.1). See Connor 1984, 208, n. 57. It is important to reiterate, in this concluding context, the nature of the divine involvement suggested here. There is no suggestion in Thucydides of some deterministic, divine causal schema. In a sense, that the Spartans believed, according to Thucydides (7.18), that they were responsible for the “first” war, that even after the Sicilian expedition, the Athenians were able to recover and hold out for nearly a decade further, all points noted and some not emphasized by Thucydides (see, esp., 2.65.11–12), helps us to appreciate the precise place of the gods in the History.  
55 Nielson’s view (1996, 403) that the gods by bringing on the plague were out to “punish the Athenians’ over-reaching pride” (cf. also Cornford 1907) seems to me to go beyond what Thucydides implies; see also Rubel 2000, 123–34, who surveys the notion of the plague as divine punishment, and above, n. 1.  
56 If the assistance of Pythian Apollo in Thucydides’ analysis carries any hint of “rightness” in the Spartan cause in initiating the war, it adds considerable interest to the historian’s representation of the Spartans that—at some undefined point—they saw themselves as the transgressors, both because of the Theban attack on Plataea and because they refused to submit to the Athenian request for arbitration according to the terms of the Thirty Years Peace (7.18.2). On the Athenians and Delos, see Constantokopoulou 2007, 66–75, and on the possible reactions of the Delians to the Athenian purification, 72–74. I have benefitted from discussing Thucydides and Delos with Robert Andrews.
If so, Thucydides seems to hint that the efforts to gain the goodwill of Apollo Delios on Delos were problematic. While Thucydides himself does not take a stand on whether the earthquake that shook Delos on the eve of war was indeed a portent, as it was taken by Greeks generally (2.8.3), its prominence contributes to the solemnity and sense of foreshadowing scale, affecting, as he states in his opening, “the entire Hellenic world” and beyond (1.1.2). Thucydides gives emphasis to the Athenians’ purification of Delos during the Archidamian war and immediately after (1.8.1, 3.104, 5.1, 32.1), but it has an aggressive aspect to it: after digging up the graves on the island, the Athenians ordered that no one should die or give birth on Delos in future (3.104.2), and later, in 422, they expelled all Delians from Delos (“during the truce which ended at the time of the Pythian games,” 5.1); they soon returned them, “mindful of their misfortunes in battles, and because of an oracle from the god at Delphi” (5.32). What stands out about these examples is that Thucydides is observing Delos and Delphi with keen interest. Questions about historiography, and history, then, remain.57

University of Oxford
e-mail: lisa.kallet@univ.ox.ac.uk

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